The Public Domain and a Right of Access: Affect upon the Broadcast Media by Moss, Donald D.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1970
The Public Domain and a Right of Access: Affect
upon the Broadcast Media
Donald D. Moss
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald D. Moss, The Public Domain and a Right of Access: Affect upon the Broadcast Media, 3 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 451 (1970).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol3/iss2/16
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND A RIGHT OF ACCESS:
AFFECT UPON THE BROADCAST MEDIA
In Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Com-
mission and its companion case, United States v. Radio Television News
Directors Association," the Supreme Court of the United States considered a
broad doctrine promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) which required a broadcast licensee to afford a "reasonable oppor-
tunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of
public importance." 2 Specifically, the Court upheld regulations formulated by
the FCC that implemented this broad fairness doctrine where an individual is
personally attacked or where a political editorial is broadcast.3 This was the
first case in which the Supreme Court considered the statutory basis and con-
stitutionality of the fairness doctrine and the attendant FCC regulations.
The fairness doctrine, as expressed in Red Lion, requires that a broad-
caster present discussion of public issues and that each side receive fair
and equal coverage.
4
The Radio Act of 19275 was the initial Congressional affirmation of its
power to regulate the broadcasting media. This Act required radio stations
to allot equal time to opposing political candidates6 and the doctrine was
subsequently extended by the Federal Radio Commission in Great Lakes
Broadcasting Company v. Federal Radio Commission,7 where it was stated:
In so far as a program consists of discussion of public questions, public interest
requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views ....
the principle applies not only to addresses by political candidates but to all dis-
1 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The two Court of Appeals cases are reported at: Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Radio Television
News Directors Assn. v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416 (1964).
3 395 U.S. at 400-01.
4 Id. at 369.
5 Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169; 44 Stat. 1162.
6 Id.
T 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 59 App. D.C. 197, 37
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where it is stated:
The initial concept of a fairness doctrine certainly had its beginning in this
[Radio] Act, which first required that radio stations allot for campaign purposes
equal time to opposing political candidates. Two years later, the Federal Radio
Commission extended the coverage of this statutory provision to all discussions of
issues of importance to the public, Great Lake Broadcasting Company v. Federal
Radio Commission. ...
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cussions of importance to the public.8 (emphasis added.)
The broadcast media in 1934 was the subject of renewed Congressional
attention which resulted in the creation of the FCC. The provisions of the
Radio Act of 1927 concerning political candidates were encompassed within
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934.9
The magnitude of the power delegated to the FCC was demonstrated in
In re The Mayflower Broadcasting Corp.10 A broadcaster, who had for over
a year (up to September, 1938) broadcast editorials urging election of various
candidates or supporting one side of a public controversy, applied for a
license renewal. Though the FCC decision referred to the concept of a
fairness doctrine, the broadcaster's "obligation of presenting all sides of
important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias," the Com-
mission stated that "the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.""1
In reluctantly granting the renewal the Commission relied on the fact
that the licensee by affidavit had pledged himself not to editorialize in the
future, and that he had not editorialized since September, 1938. But it
also lent considerable weight to the lack of other acceptable applications
for the frequency and the attendant loss of service to the public if the present
application were denied.
Although not specifically prohibiting editorializing,' 2 the basis for the
renewal did leave open the question whether a licensee could within his ob-
ligation of operating within the "public interest' 3 express editorial opin-
ions of his own on matters of public concern. The FCC, recognizing
that manifest difficulties inhered in the fairness doctrine, conducted hearings
to provide more specific guidelines which resulted in the 1949 Report of
Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees.14 The
FCC described "editorialization" as
the use of radio facilities by the licensees thereof for the expression of the
opinions and ideas of the licensee on the various controversial and significant
issues of interest to the members of the general. public afforded radio (or televi-
sion) service by the particular station.' 5
The Commission further declared a right of licensees to editorialize, at the
8 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929).
9 Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 was incorporated in
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088.
10 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
11 Id. at 340.
12 Cf. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine, supra note 2, at 10426, Appendix B,
entitled "The History of the Fairness Doctrine" where it is stated:
in Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. [it was] stated . . . : 'In brief, the broad-
caster cannot be an advocate.' This statement was widely accepted as an
outright prohibition of broadcast editorializing, and, in view of the reaction to
such policy, the Commission. . . initiated [the 1947 proceedings].
13 The obligation is imposed by 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), and 309(a) (1964).
14 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
15 Id. at 1252.
NOTES
same time recognizing an obligation to present all sides of opinion in the
discussion of public issues.
The Report and its requirements were not beyond attack even at that
early date. Commissioner Jones, in a separate opinion, stated that any de-
cision permitting a licensee to editorialize required a reversal of Mayflower
"which fully and completely suppressed and prohibited the licensee from
speaking in the future over his facilities in behalf of any cause."'16 In
agreeing that the Mayflower rule should be changed, he argued that con-
ditioning editorializing by the fairness doctrine was a restraint violating the
First Amendment as it restrained the licensee in his freedoms of speech and
press. The majority of the Commission countered:
The freedom of speech protected against governmental abridgement by the first
amendment does not extend any privilege to government licensees of means of
public communications to exclude the expression of opinions and ideas with which
they are in disagreement. We believe, on the contrary, that a requirement that
broadcast licensees utilize their franchises in a manner in which the listening
public may be assured of hearing varying opinions on the paramount issues facing
the American people is within both the spirit and letter of the first amendment.17
Thus the Commission recognized a duty in the licensee to afford "a reason-
able opportunity for the presentation of all responsible positions"' 8 and to
take a "conscious and positive role in bringing about balanced presentation
of the opposing viewpoints."'' 9
The Report was also significant because the Commission commented upon
the broadcasting of personal attacks. They stated that "elementary consid-
erations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person or group
which has been specifically attacked over the station, where otherwise no
such obligation would exist." 20 For the first time a suggestion that the fair-
ness doctrine encompassed protections of a personally attacked individual or
group, enforced by an allocation of time, was officially recognized.
Congress in 1959 amended Section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934.21 Exempting certain news programs from the equal time require-
ment for political candidates, a proviso stated:
Nothing in the foregoing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in
connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them
under this [Act] to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable oppor-
16 Id. at 1259.
17 Id. at 1256.
18 Id. at 1250.
19 Id. at 1251. "Conscious and positive role" was described in terms that:
The Commission has consequently recognized the necessity for licensees to devote
a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation of news and
programs devoted to the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest
in the community served by the particular station. Id. at 1249.
20 Id. at 1252.
21 73 Stat. 557 (1962), amending 48 Stat. 1088 (1934).
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tunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance.
22
(emphasis added.)
This proviso served as a foundation for the judicial determination in Red
Lion that Section 315 is a statutory basis for the fairness doctrine.23
The Commission in 1963 sent to all licensees a public notice of its spe-
cific procedures required to implement the personal attack segments of the
fairness doctrine. These procedures required that:
When a controversial program involves a personal attack upon an individual or
organization, the licensee must transmit the text of the broadcast to the person
or group attacked, wherever located, either prior to or at the time of the broad-
cast, with a specific offer of his station's facilities for an adequate response. 24
A later public notice commonly known as the "Fairness Primer" refined
and restated the applicable rules in more explicit detail. 25
On November 27, 1964, radio station WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsyl-
vania, whose licensee is Red Lion Broadcasting Co., presented The Chris-
tian Crusade, a fifteen minute sponsored program featuring Reverend Billy
James Hargis. Reverend Hargis discussed the 1964 Presidential election
with attention to a book entitled Goldwater-Extremist on the Right au-
thored by Fred J. Cook. Reverend Hargis alleged:
Cook was fired from the New York World Telegram after he made a false charge
publicly on television against an un-named official of the New York City govern-
ment. New York publishers and Newsweek Magazine for December 7, 1959,
showed that Fred Cook and his pal, Eugene Gleason, had made up the whole
story and this confession was made to the New York District Attorney ....
[Niow this is the man who wrote the book to smear and destroy Barry Gold-
water .... 26
Cook wrote to WGCB stating that if such an attack had been made, he re-
quested free time to reply. In response WGCB furnished Cook with its
rate card.
27
A further exchange of letters between Cook and WGCB followed with
the station holding to its position that Cook should pay for any air time.
Cook then filed a complaint with the FCC resulting in an exchange of
letters between Red Lion and the FCC. Red Lion thereupon modified its
stand and indicated that it would grant Cook free time but only if he ad-
vised Red Lion that he was unable to pay. In referring Red Lion to the
22 Id.
23 395 U.S. at 380-82.
24 25 PIKE & FiscimR Rio RaG. 1899, 1900 (1963). The Pike and Fischer Radio
Regulation series is an unofficial compilation of FCC public notices, public letters,
letters directed to specific licensees in relation to specific disputes, and other general
statements by the FCC.
25 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine, supra note 2. The "Fairness Primer" is
a statement in digest form of the past rulings in specific cases by the FCC where
the fairness doctrine was at issue.
26 395 U.S. 367, 371 n.2 (1969).
27 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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"Fairness Primer" and to the licensee's obligation contained therein, the
FCC commented:
The licensee is, of course, perfectly free to inquire whether the individual is
willing to pay to appear. .... [He is] also free to obtain a sponsor for the pro-
gram in which the reply is broadcast, or to present the reply on the particular
program series involved, if this is agreeable to the parties such as Mr. Cook and
Reverend Hargis.
28
The burden was on Red Lion to find sponsorship, and if they could not,
Cook was to receive free time regardless of his ability to pay.29 Red Lion
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
to review the order of the FCC.
30
Upholding the order, the court determined that Section 315 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, as amended in 1959,31 adopted the fairness doc-
trine and was a proper delegation of Congress' legislative function. The
pivotal issue was framed by the court:
Does the Fairness Doctrine impair free speech in violation of the first amendment
by imposing a prior restraint upon the expression of views, arguments and
opinions by petitioners, as well as by all other owners of radio stations, and upon
those who pay for the use of such facilities?
3 2
The court answered that licensees "are not required to submit any broad-
cast material to the Commission. . . prior to broadcast. It is obvious that
there is involved in this case no censorship which constitutes prior or pre-
vious restraint."33  Petitioner contended that fear of punishment ( a denial
of their ultimate renewal application) constitutes a de facto restraint upon
the exercise of their free speech guarantees. The court rejected any basis
for such fear because "the remedial provisions of title 47 U.S.C, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, and the accessibility of the courts guarantee
petitioners full redress from any illegal, arbitrary or capricious conduct on
the part of the Commission."3 4 The court concluded that:
28 Id. at 913. A full recitation of the interchanged letters is contained at 911-15.
29 Id. at 915.
30 Id. at 908. At first the petition was dismissed for want of a reviewable order.
On second application the court granted appeal to the petitioner who convinced the
court that the FCC rule which permitted it to issue a declaratory ruling was justified by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964). Though the FCC
did not comply with all requirements for an adjudicative proceeding, the petitioner
had adopted the FCC's position that this was a reviewable order thus waiving any
objection petitioner might have had. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 372 n.3 (1969).
31 "Equal Time Act", 73 Stat. 557 (1962), amending 48 Stat. 1088 (1934).
32 381 F.2d 908, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33 Id. at 929. This statement by the court is conclusionary and non-responsive.
Even if a licensee is not required to submit any broadcast material to the FCC, the
fact that a licensee must comply with the mandates of the fairness doctrine or be
faced, as was Red Lion Broadcasting Co., with revocation of their license for non-
compliance certainly can restrain the licensee in his choice of broadcast material.
84 Id. It remains to be seen if this is an adequate answer. It is difficult to deter-
1970]
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There is no abrogation of the petitioners' free speech right. On the contrary, I
find that the conduct of the petitioners absent the remedial procedures afforded the
complainant Cook would, in fact, constitute a serious abridgement of his free
speech rights.3 5
Shortly after the Red Lion decision, the FCC, attempting to make the
personal attack and political editorial rules of the fairness doctrine more
precise, published regulations essentially providing that where an individual
or group is personally attacked the licensee is required to notify them of
such attack, provide them with a tape or script of the attack, and offer
an opportunity to respond. Exempted from the requirements are attacks on
foreign groups or public figures, or attacks made by legally qualified candi-
dates, their authorized spokesmen or associates, and attacks made during
bona fide newscasts, news interviews and on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events including commentary or analysis. The political editorial
rules require that a licensee who in an editorial endorses or opposes a le-
gally qualified candidate must within twenty-four hours transmit a script
or tape of the editorial with an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond
to the other candidates.
36
mine what specific provisions of the Communications Act protect against a de facto
restraint. How the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11, prevents a
de facto restraint is even more elusive.
35 381 F.2d 908, 929 (1967). The court did not deal with the specific application
of the personal attack ruling, rather, it discussed in broad terms whether or not the
fairness doctrine was constitutional. This failing was noted and used by the court
as a means of distinguishing this case in the companion case of Radio Television News
Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968). See Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MiNN. LAW REv. 67, 144-50 (1967) for a critical analysis of the
Court of Appeals decision. There it is stated: "Unfortunately, the court recognized
no distinction between the broad scope of the fairness doctrine and the more limited
personal attack rule." Id. at 149.
36 The regulations (47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679, which are all
identical) as amended read:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a reasonable
time and in no event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or
group attacked (1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broad-
cast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not
available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond
over the licensee's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable (1)
to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures; (2) to personal attacks
which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or
those associated with them in the campaign . . . ; and (3) to bona fide newscasts,
bona fide news interviews, and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event
(including commentary or analysis contained in the foregoing programs, but the
provisions of paragraph (a) . . . shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee.)
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the
editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates
for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (1) notification
Shortly after the FCC promulgated its regulations there came the in-
evitable challenge in Radio Television News Directors Association v. United
States.37 The Association (RTNDA) in seeking review of the regulations
vigorously asserted that the regulations imposed unconstitutional burdens
on their freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment. RTNDA
also challenged the fairness doctrine itself on the same constitutional ground.
The court relied on New York Times Company v. Sullivan38 and concluded
that the impact of that decision upon the facts of this case was
that the freedom of the press to disseminate views on issues of public importance
must be protected from the imposition of unreasonable burdens by governmental
action.3 9
In accepting RTNDA's contention, the court further noted that inhibition
"from the substantial economic and practical burdens which attend the
mandatory requirements of notification, the provision of a tape, and the
arrangement for a reply" 40 is analogous to the New York Times inhibition
from a possible damages award for libel. In contradistinction to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Seventh Circuit found the rules to
be vague as well as constituting an unconstitutional abridgment of the
freedom of the press.
41
II
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Red Lion and
RTNDA as consolidated cases. A unanimous Court (Justice Douglas not
sitting) resolved the conflict between the circuits by affirming Red Lion
and reversing RTNDA. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court.
42
Initially the Court concluded that the FCC possessed the statutory au-
of the date and time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; and
(3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate ... to respond over the
licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That where such editorials are broadcast
within 72 hours prior to the day of the election, the licensee shall comply with the
provisions of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast to enable
the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response
and to present it in a timely fashion.
A complete discussion of the history of each amendment is contained in 400 F.2d
1002, 1004-10 (7th Cir. 1968).
3T 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968).
as 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39 400 F.2d at 1012 (footnote omitted).
40 Id.
41 The court distinguished the Court of Appeals' decision in Red Lion by stating,
in effect, that Red Lion only upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. The
court clarified that it was not prepared to declare the fairness doctrine unconstitutional.
But, it would refute the Red Lion decision inasmuch as its effect was to uphold the
personal attack rules. Id. at 1017-18. In conclusion the court stated that it need
not determine whether 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964) authorized promulgation of the per-
sonal attack and political editorial rules, since they hold that such rules violate the
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. Id. at 1021.
42 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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thority to promulgate regulations regarding standards of fairness in the
broadcast media.43 Apparently authority was predicated upon either of
two statutory grounds. The broader authorization was derived from a
mandate to the FCC to promulgate such regulations "as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires."44 However, the opinion indicates that a
more specific authorization accrues from the proviso contained in the 1959
Amendment of Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934. 46 Noth-
ing in the Section, according to the proviso, shall be construed as excepting
licensees "from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate
in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance. (emphasis added.) '"'
This Amendment was accepted by the Court as Congressional approval of
the fairness doctrine. Congress' affirmative action was interpreted as a
reinforcement of its longstanding acquiescence to the Commission's con-
struction of "public interest". 47
The Court concluded that the personal attack and political editorializing
rules were an authorized part of the fairness doctrine, 48 reasoning that
Congress' non-responsiveness to the 1949 Report of the Commission in the
Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees49 could be equated with
approval. In describing suggested rules the Report stated "elementary con-
siderations of fairness may dictate that time be allocated to a person or group
which has been specifically attacked." 50  Although not construing the 1959
Amendment as a ratification of every FCC pronouncement, the Court added
that it would be a misconstruction to hold that it did not authorize these
personal attack and political editorializing regulations.5 1
Public interest demands that the regulations be enforced by the "equal
time" provisions, rather than leaving the response with the station which
has made the attack or editorial.52 Congress had specifically provided
that a broadcaster who grants time to a political candidate must provide
equal time to his opponents.53 The Court stated:
It would exceed our competence to hold that the Commission is unauthorized by
the statute to employ a similar device where personal attacks or political editorials
are broadcast by a radio or television station.5 4
43 Id. at 375-86.
44 Id. at 379 quoting from 47 U.S.C. § 303 and § 303(r).
45 Id. at 380. The amendment is found at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
46 395 U.S. at 380, quoting from 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964).
47 395 U.S. at 381-82.
48 Id. at 385.
49 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
50 Id. at 1252.
51 395 U.S. at 385-86.
52 Id. at 385.
53 Id. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
54 395 U.S. at 385. However, the political candidate "equal time" requirement of
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964) does not require free "equal time". The FCC in Red Lion had
ordered free air time to the personally attacked individual. The Court did not discuss
how 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964) could so authorize free "equal time".
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These findings required the Court to discuss the First Amendment argu-
ments.
The broadcasters contended that the fairness doctrine and the personal
attack and political editorializing regulations violated their First Amend-
ment rights. 55 In dismissing this contention the Court noted that "differ-
ences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them."'5
6
Drawing an analogy to the restriction of sound amplification equip-
ment, the Court pointed out that the broadcast media does fall within the
ambit of First Amendment protections. However, this protection is not
absolute. It declared:
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound amplifying equipment potentially
so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit
the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the
user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff
out the free speech of others. (emphasis added.) 5 7
Since the number of radio frequencies is technologically limited, only a
few individuals can command control of this power, and:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or
publish .... as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed
stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused.58
Justice White observed that there is nothing which would prevent the
government from assigning more than one licensee to a frequency.50 Al-
though not disclaiming the applicability of the First Amendment to pub-
lie broadcasters, he stressed that "It is the rights of the viewers and listeners
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 60
In the instant case, the Supreme Court has lent new dimension and
context to the traditional First Amendment questions which were raised
by the licensee's counsel. Contained within the opinion is language, as
above, which suggests that the broadcasters' rights are at least subordinated
to the public's, if indeed, their First Amendment rights are distinct from
55 Id. at 386.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 387.
58 Id. at 388-89.
59 Id. at 389.
60 Id. at 389-90. Vice President Agnew in his stinging attack on broadcast licensees,
Nov. 13, 1969, before the Mid-West Regional Republican Committee at Des Moines,
Iowa, found cause to quote this passage from the opinion. He prefaced his comments
with the observation
Now a virtual monopoly of a whole medium of communication is not something
that democratic people should blindly ignore. And we are not going to cut off
our television sets and listen to the phonograph just because the airways belong to
the networks. They don't. They belong to the people. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
1969, at 24, col. 5.
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the public's. To this end the Court suggested that:
the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective
right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
First Amendment. (emphasis added.)61
The licensees framed the issue in terms of their First Amendment rights.
0 2
The Court, however, seems to have reflected upon the underlying source
of their rights and to have viewed the broadcaster as a conduit for the
public's First Amendment rights. An analogy can be drawn to a master/
servant or a stockholder/proxy relationship wherein a broadcaster con-
ceivably stands in the shoes of the public and represents those rights that
belong to the public. The Court approached an articulation of this concept
with the following language indicating that the broadcaster's obligation is:
to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary
with the obligation to present those views and voices which are representative of
his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves. (emphasis added.) 63
Future litigants in this area might well be advised to take cognizance of this
method of analysis in structuring their arguments.64
Perhaps fearful of boldly adopting a novel position emasculating broad-
casters' independent First Amendment rights, the Court retreated to a more
limited setting which accorded it the opportunity to refine the issue accord-
ingly: Whose First Amendment freedoms will prevail, those of the broad-
casters or the public. 65 A determination was reached by weighing the relative
61 395 U.S. at 390.
62 Respondents (RTNDA) Brief for Certiorari at 28, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Petitioner in its brief stated:
[Licensees] are subjected to a burden or penalty, consisting of the expense in-
volved in locating the subject of the personal attack, furnishing him with a script,
recording or summary of the broadcast, and thereafter granting him free time in
which to reply-time which otherwise might be allocated to a paying sponsor.
Petitioner's (Red Lion) Brief for Certiorari at 22, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
63 395 U.S. at 389.
64 This is not to suggest that the broadcaster is totally deprived of First Amendment
protections. The FCC has power to insist upon discussion of controversial issues but
no power to initiate discussion of a particular area. If such an attempt were made
by the FCC, the broadcaster would stand upon his own First Amendment guarantees.
This should suggest a close investigation, by counsel, of the foundation of the rights
of the broadcaster as inferred in Red Lion. The position of the licensee might well be
only a standing to assert the rights of others as he meets the requirements as set out in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Indeed, without un-
precedented action by the FCC the standing to assert the rights of others may well
be the broadcaster's only position.
65 This does not undermine the conceptualization of the broadcaster's proxy position
discussed above. This was the question as presented to the Court. The Court, by its
decision, added weight to the above concept through its discussion. As a result of the
structure of the questions, it might be suggested that the Court decided two issues.
First, the regulations are not unconstitutional, and second, as a prerequisite to the
first, the broadcaster had only those rights that flow from the "public interest". If this
[Vol. 3
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power of each in relation to the limited availability of broadcast frequencies.
Justice White stated that without the disputed FCC regulations:
station owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time
available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on
public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with
whom they agreed. (emphasis added.) 66
Summarily rejecting the broadcaster's contention that the regulations
were so vague as to be impossible to discern, 67 the Court presented its hold-
ing based upon three factors:
In view of the prevalence of scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's
role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable
without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression
of their views, we hold the regulations and ruling at issue here are both authorized
by statute and constitutional. (emphasis added.) 68
As discussed above, the government's role changes the status of the favored
licensee from individual to representative. As a prelude to the limited
holding, the Court also held:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of
using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to
give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. (emphasis
added.) 69
Such language furthers the suggestion that the broadcaster must appear
before the Court as an advocate of the public.
The Court, however, was not without other theories on which it could
have reached the First Amendment problem. Reliance could have been
placed, for example, on the underlying rationale of contracts of adhesion. 70
Positing their decision upon "the legitimate claims of those unable without
governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression
of their views",71 the Court has implicitly recognized that freedom of
speech includes the ability of the individual to be free to express himself.
In an anthology of cases, a similar rationale has been applied to freedom
of contract.72  In a factual setting where two parties enter into a contract
theory is followed, the issue would be framed: Whose First Amendment freedoms
should be upheld, those of Cook or those of the public represented by the broadcaster?
Of course, under this statement of the issue, Cook would vigorously contend that the
public's First Amendment freedoms would be best upheld by giving him access vis-h-vis
upholding the regulations.
66 395 U.S. at 392.
67 Id. at 395-96.
68 Id. at 400-01.
69 Id. at 394.
70 For a thorough analytical consideration of this judicial phenomenon see Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629 (1943).
71 395 U.S. at 400.
72 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), is the
leading case. There, a disclaimer of tort liability found in virtually all contracts for
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and one party possesses such a powerful bargaining position such that the
other party is unable to bargain for the terms of the contract, courts
have refused to enforce the terms of the contract. Those courts implicitly
recognized that freedom of contract includes the ability of the individual
to be free to bargain. As early as 1942, a dissenting Justice Frankfurter
postulated this rationale which underlies that which is generally referred
to as the doctrine of "contracts of adhesion".73 In a freedom of expression
or contract case, where the power of one party is so disproportionate in
relation to the other party's ability to be free to either express himself or to
contract, the court could theoretically reach a decision based upon the
rationale that the party must be able to express himself or contract.74
sale of new automobiles (in fact, the Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n used a uniform
disclaimer) was held unenforceable due to the disproportionate bargaining positions and
the inability of the consumer to bargain at all. The theory of adhesion was mentioned
in an earlier case, Raulet v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292
(1910), and in Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe'y of United States, 70 N.D. 122,
293 N.W. 200 (1940); also Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942) (contracts between shipbuilder
and United States during World War I). Following Kessler's article the doc-
trine received more attention; see Justice Frank's dissent in Siegelman v. Cunard
White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (provision in ticket for passage that
action against Cunard must be commenced within one year from end of voyage);
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (patient's release of hospital negligence liability found adhesive); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)
(warranty disclaimer held adhesive); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377
P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) (air flight insurance issued from vending machine
which limited coverage to scheduled airlines only, and insured used non-scheduled, held
clause of adhesion); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1961) (an employment contract was referred to as a contract of adhesion).
For legislative approval of the doctrine see UNrORmon CoMMErcAIL CODE § 2-302;
see generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. OF PA. Rnv. 485 (1967); Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A
Suggested Approach to UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. OF PA. L. REv. 998 (1966).
73 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942) (dissenting
opinion).
74 In the broadcast media the licensee possesses a typically powerful position vastly
unequal to the complaining individual in relation to freedom of expression. This is
similar to the powerful position that an insurance company or automobile manufacturer
possesses in relation to the ability of an individual to bargain. See Steven v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) and Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.Y. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In contracts of adhe-
sion cases it was recognized that to permit adhesion by the powerful corporation
would be to permit the corporation to make its own private contract law without the
individual having any ability to share in that law-making process. See generally
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931),
and Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the Adhesion Con-
tractor's Lawmaking, 16 KAN. L. REv. 303 (1968). As expressed by Kessler, "Freedom
of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more im-
portant, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appear-
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Recognizing a right of access to the broadcast media as essential to an
individual's constitutional guarantees did not need, perhaps, for its founda-
tion, the contract of adhesion ratonale because the government was in-
volved. The government's power to regulate the broadcasting industry
in order to protect the public's interest was again upheld by the Court:
the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared
among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of
the broadcast day or the broadcast week. The ruling and regulations at issue
here do not go quite so far. (emphasis added.) 75
It is important to note that the Court does not accept the regulations
at issue as representative of the outer limits of the government's power.
Rather, it states that regulations are well within the ambit of Congress'
power to protect an individual's constitutional guarantees in relation to the
broadcast media. While not approving of every past FCC application of
the regulations, 76 the Court did allude to both the government's role and
the underlying rationale of the contracts of adhesion theory to uphold the
constitutionality of the regulations and their specific application in this
case. If the Court did not uphold the regulations, it was stated that broad-
casters would have "unfettered power to make time available only to the
highest bidders . . . and to permit on the air only those with whom they
agree." (emphasis added.)77 The Court's approach indicates that the con-
tracts of adhesion rationale might well have been implemented if govern-
ment's role was absent.78
ance of authoritarian forms." Kessler, supra note 70 at 640. Compare this lawmaking
process in contracts of adhesion to Justice White's statement in Red Lion that without
the regulations licensees would have "unfettered power to make time available only
to the highest bidders ... and to permit on the air only those with whom they agree."
(emphasis added.) 395 U.S. at 392. It is suggested that without these regu-
lations licensees would totally 'legislate' 'expression' law in the broadcast media.
And the individual is unable to gain access for expression without government's
assistance. The powerful licensee would solely control the ability of the individual
to express himself. Red Lion recognized a "right of access" as a means of guaranteeing
expression.
75 395 U.S. at 390-91.
76 Id. at 396.
77 Id. at 392.
78 An administrative agency has been said to depend upon the existence of circum-
stances of adhesion such that the agency's role is to balance the unbalanced power
positions. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that the rationale for administrative
agencies is:
Wherever a continuing series of controversies exists between a powerful and con-
centrated interest on one side and a diversified mass of individuals, each of whose
separate interest may be small, on the other side, the only means of obtaining
equality before the law has been to place the controversy in an administrative
tribunal. H.R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1940), contained in
Comment, Administrative Regulation of Adhesion Contracts in Israel, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1340 n.1 (1966).
The Comment suggests an administrative solution to contracts of adhesion similar
to that involked in Israel. Compare this to the role of the FCC in the question of
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Pursuant to the "power" considerations discussed above, might it be
argued that the print media is similarily characterized (but for govern-
ment's role) so as to fall within the contracts of adhesion rationale? Nor
would the prospect of a legislative, administrative or judicial assent to a
right of access to respond to a newspaper attack constitute a novel ap-
proach. Professor Chafee, writing in 1947 for the Commission on Free-
dom of the Press, 79 stated:
as an alternative to the present remedy for libel, we recommend legislation by
which the injured party might obtain a retraction or a restatement of the facts
by the offender or an opportunity to reply. (emphasis added.) 80
The relation between libel and a right of access is well illustrated in
New York Times Company v. Sullivan.81 Both Red Lion Broadcasting Com-
pany and RTNDA strongly relied on this case to support their position.82
They argued that "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"8 debate requires that
licensees be free from the burden of these FCC regulations. RTNDA
maintained that: "The 'personal attacks' of which the Commission seeks
to lay hold are the same kind of criticism of public figures that New York
Times held to be constitutionally privileged."8 4  However, New York
Times did not hold that criticism of public figures is an absolute consti-
tutional privilege. It is constitutionally privileged only to the extent that
a showing of "actual malice" is required to recover damages for the libelous
criticism.85
the ability of an individual to gain access to the media. It might be suggested that
the role of the FCC is to offset the adhesive position of the licensee versus the
individual.
79 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947). The Commis-
sion on Freedom of the Press also included Robert M. Hutchins (Chairman), John M.
Clark, John Dickenson, William E. Hocking, Harold D. Lasswell, Archibald MacLeish,
Charles E. Merriam, Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Redfield, Beardsley Rum], Aurthur M.
Schlesinger and George N. Shuster.
80 Id. at 801.
81 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82 Petitioner's (Red Lion) Brief for Certiorari at 21-22, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Respondent's (RTNDA) Brief for Certiorari
at 21-22, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), where it is
stated: "The basic proposition is very simple: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
... governs this case."
83 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Time Co,
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"-
A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MicK. L. REV. 289 (1968).
84 Respondent's (RTNDA) Brief for Certiorari at 21, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
85 New York Times required a showing that the libel was committed with "actual
malice" which was defined as "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Justice Black,
with whom Justice Douglas concurred, stated that "'malice,' even as defined by
the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove," Id.
at 293.
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The Court of Appeals in RTNDA accepted RTNDA's argument.8 6 The
Court of Appeals in Red Lion rejected a similar argument.8 7 The Supreme
Court was austerely silent in their decision of the companion cases con-
cerning the affect of New York Times.88 And it was precisely the non-
responsiveness to this case that caused the opinion to be something less
than lucid.
RTNDA argued that its case was not distinguishable from New York
Times notwithstanding the different remedies being sought, a right of
access in the instant case and damages in New York Times.8 9 But RTNDA
expressed this merely as a conclusion whereas the remedy sought did con-
stitute a clear difference between the two cases.
In New York Times the Court was faced with determining whether one
party's (the publisher's) freedoms of speech and press should be restricted in
order that a personally attacked individual could be awarded $500,000
damages. Awarding such damages for libel, which was contained in a
political advertisement, certainly would cause the publisher to censor ad-
vertisements submitted to his newspaper and consequently restrict the pub-
lisher's freedom of press. 90 Unlike Red Lion, there were no intersecting
freedoms of speech and press of the personally attacked individual against
which restricting the publisher's freedoms could be counter-balanced. The
Commissioner from Alabama, Sullivan, in New York Times, sought
$500,000, not that his freedoms of speech and press be protected by per-
mitting him equal time to rebut.9 1
Secondly, New York Times would support, at most, a showing of "ac-
tual malice" as a catalyst for the application of the personal attack or politi-
cal editorial regulations. New York Times did not eliminate the cause of
action for libel. A fortiori reliance on that case would not support elimi-
nating the FCC's power to grant a right of access. However, in light of
86 Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1011-13
(7th Cir. 1968).
87 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
88 Though the case was cited, it was in reference to a separate concept. See 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
89 Respondent's (RTNDA) Brief for Certiorari at 21, Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90 Alternatively, publishers might seek to extract either an exaggerated fee or a
guarantee from an advertiser. If this failed or if it is the publisher's own attack, he
will have to consider the possibility of the extra cost. That extra cost, to a publisher
who is dollar conscious, could lead him to censor such attacks.
91 "Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel
action . . . unless he first makes a written demand for a public retraction and the
defendant fails or refuses to comply. Alabama Code, Tit. 7, § 914." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261 (1964). Thus, Sullivan sought a retraction
as a precondition to seeking punitive damages. The Times refused to retract. In
the libel action, Sullivan did not seek retraction which clearly would have been an
,ttempt to assert his First Amendment guarantees. Rather, he sought damages.
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the holding in Red Lion, that the personally attacked individual or victim
of a political editorial has a First Amendment guarantee to access, the find-
ing of "actual malice" is unnecessary. In New York Times, restriction of
the publisher's rights was offset by burdening the personally attacked in-
dividual with showing that the libel occurred with "actual malice". In Red
Lion the freedoms of speech and press of the individual offset restriction of the
licensee's rights.
No less an authority on mass communications than Jerome Barron has
commented upon the New York Times case in relationship to a general
right of access. 92 Pointing out that the New York Times decision might
reduce the likelihood of a retraction, he mentioned that the failure of
courts to require publishing a reply ignored a device commonly used in
other countries. He champions the theory that a right of reply should be
mandatory, if a court, as it did in New York Times, immunizes the press
from financial attack:
If financial immunization by the Supreme Court is necessary to ensure a
courageous press, the public officials who fall prey to such judicially reinforced
lions should at least have the right to respond or to demand retraction in the
pages of the newspapers which have published charges against them. The oppor-
tunity for counterattack ought to be at the very heart of a constitutional theory
which supposedly is concerned with providing an outlet for individuals who 'wish
to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the
press.' 93
Barron has offered conclusions similar to Chafee's although he has come
closer to adopting the contracts of adhesion rationale. Commenting on the
void left by the New York Times decision he pointed out:
What the Court has done is to magnify the power of one of the participants in the
communications process with apparently no thought of imposing on newspapers
concomitant responsibilities to assure that the new protection will actually enlarge
and protect opportunities for expression.9 4
This is an application of the contracts of adhesion rationale to the news-
paper industry. The decision in Red Lion can only accelerate this ap-
proach in future debate and thought about a responsive and responsible
role of the American print media vis-h-vis the First Amendment rights of
the "non-press".
92 Some of Barron's contributions in the area are: D. GLMoRE & J. BARRON, MASS
COMMUNICA=oNs LAw, CASES AmD COMmENT (1969); Barron, An Emerging First
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969);
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAMv. L. REV. 1641
(1967); Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale For Broad-
casting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 31 (1964); Barron, The Federal
Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEo. WASH. L.
Rnv. 1 (1961).
93 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, supra note 92, at
1658.
94 Id. at 1658-59.
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Red Lion enforced a remedy of access to a broadcasting frequency. The
Court stated its rationale for such a remedy:
prevalence of [technological] scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Govern-
ment's role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those
unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for
expression of their views. .... 95
In a closing footnote to its decision the Court stated that the existence of
economic scarcity as a factor for upholding the fairness doctrine and the
regulations need not be considered because it found scarcity based upon
technological limitations.9 6 However, Justice White does suggest that if
there were no technological scarcity, there still would be ample reason to
uphold a right of access.
Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, net-
work affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing
broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry
is technologically possible. (emphasis added.)97
Consequently, the Court's rationale in the future may not be limited to
either economic or technological grounds, nor at government's involvement
in allocating frequencies; rather, it may be directed to the power of the
broadcaster. The Court's concern is: Can the broadcaster limit access?
Scarcity, as the term is used by the Court, appears to be synonymous
with non-availability. The reason for the scarcity is stated to be tech-
nology. Since there are only so many frequencies over which a limited
number of licensees can broadcast, not all may use the medium.
Both scarcity (non-availability) and government involvement contribute
to a licensee's powerful position. It is this power position coupled with "the
legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain
access ...for expression of their views"9 8 that requires a right of access
remedy.
Does the print media possess this same position of power in relation to
the ability of an individual to gain access?99 Though the government takes
95 395 U.S. at 400.
96 Id. at 401 n.28.
97 Id. at 400.
98 Id.
99 Prof. Jerome Barron in writing about the United States Court of Appeal decision
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. stated that:
The Red Lion determination that the duty of the broadcaster to furnish an unpaid
reply to a personal attack was not violative of the first amendment is an im-
portant step in the evolution of a constitutional theory that will be sensitive to
the unanticipated power which the marriage of technology and capital has
placed in the relatively few hands which dominate mass communications. Barron,
An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 487, 506 (1969). Id.
In writing of the possible effect to be gained by a Supreme Court consideration of
this case, he went on to state:
Perhaps when Red Lion is finally reviewed by the Supreme Court the centrality
of the concept of access to the problem of protecting freedom of expression will
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no direct part in allocating who can print, economic factors demonstrate
that a similar scarcity exists in the print media.' 00 The power position
of the newspaper publisher, in terms of power over access, is no less than
the power position of those who control broadcast media. In fact, Ameri-
can cities frequently support more broadcast stations than newspapers, 0 1
and this is equally applicable to rural areas. 10 2  In terms of scarcity,
newspapers are often less available than broadcast stations. And, in
terms of ability to obtain access, it is perhaps as difficult to develop a
newspaper as it is to obtain a broadcast license and the necessary facili-
ties.' 03 The foregoing strongly suggests that the "adhesion" or "power"
rationale might be imposed on newspapers in order to generate a right
of access.
If society, through its legal machinery, recognizes this power position of
newspapers and responds with a "right of access", questions arise as to the
effect upon newspaper content. Allegations that this response would force
self-censorship would be raised as they were in Red Lion.10 4 The Court,
in answering this contention as applied to broadcasters, found no such
abuse under the regulations and rulings in the past.10 The Court noted
that "such a result would indeed be a serious matter, for should licensees
actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, the purposes of the
be considered. The presentation of such an issue could not help but expose the
incomplete nature of the present law in the area where the law of libel and the
first amendment intersect. Id.
In terms of Prof. Barron's observations, it is valuable to consider the degree to which
the Supreme Court did recognize the "centrality of the concept of access to the
problem of protecting freedom of expression" and whether it did expose "the incom-
plete nature of the present law in the area where the law of libel and the first
amendment intersect." Id.
100 There may be indirect roles such as taxation.
i01 For instance, Chicago in 1967 had 13 daily newspapers and 79 broadcasting
stations (32 AM, 39 FM, and 8 TV); Detroit had 5 daily newspapers and 41 broad-
casting stations (12 AM, 23 FM, and 6 TV). Respondent's (RTNDA) Brief for
Certiorari at 47 n.40, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
102 Nevada had 31 broadcast stations (19 AM, 7 FM, and 5 TV), 7 daily and 4
Sunday newspapers. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 503 and 507 (1968).
103 It seems untenable to state that since it is possible for one to develop a news-
paper without application to the government for a license, one's freedom of expression
is protected in the print media without a right of access. How long would it have
taken Sullivan to develop a newspaper comparable to the New York Times?
L04 395 U.S. at 392-93. The Supreme Court has recognized the monumental
influence that both broadcast and print media possess. Cf. Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), where news
coverage denied the accuseds due process of law. See also Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). The Court found a violation of the Sherman
Act where the only two daily newspapers in Tucson, Arizona had an operating agree-
ment which included price fixing, profit pooling, and market control.
105 395 U.S. at 393.
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doctrine would be stifled."'10 6 Declaring that "there will be time enough
to reconsider the constitutional implications", 107 if this effect is shown in
the future, the Court also relied upon the power of the FCC to insist that
licensees give adequate attention to public issues.' 08
But the Court in its summary discussion of this area failed to examine
in any depth the dollar motivation of a licensee. 0 9  The broadcaster
would visualize the sanction of free time as a violation of its general business
ethic and his natural reaction to the regulations would seem to result in an
effort to avoid their application by self-censorship.
Without the regulations, self-censorship is not foreign to a broadcaster.
He most likely has used this device in response to audience criticism, dis-
cord with a sponsor, low ratings, as well as his own personal taste. 10
Except for the last mentioned possibility these devices will be employed to
optimize profit. The regulations serve to compound the broadcaster's di-
lemma. If he will censor a program from the airwaves because of low
ratings, how can he permit a prime time personal attack or political edi-
torial when the result might cause a loss of an equal amount of prime
time in the future?"'
For the above reasons it is suggested that the regulations might tend to
reward blandness in the broadcasting industry." 2 However, there are
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Cf. N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME, Tnr PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST 49 (1964), where he stated that the broadcast industry returned 19.2% on their
investment in 1960. Mr. Minow was Chairman of the FCC during President Ken-
nedy's administration. The licensee seeking a profit no more wants to give free air
time that would otherwise be paid for, than does any other businessman want to give
away free that which earns him profit.
110 See Barron, it Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 31, 47 (1964), where he
stated:
Individual instances of the [broadcast] industry acting as censor are fairly common
and are found particularly in regard to programming considered to be 'entertain-
ment' ....
In the accompanying footnote to this statement, Prof. Barron states: "The industry
itself sometimes acts as censor and makes programming decisions of great consequence
on the basis of slight adverse public criticism." Id. at 47 n.68, citing House Comm.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT TO TELEvISION NrTWoRK PROCURE-
MENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 370 (1963). An overt example of
licensee censorship might be The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour.
111 The censorial effect of "equal time" regulations can be seen in the Nixon-
Kennedy debates where suspension by Congress of the "equal time" requirement [47
U.S.C. § 317 (1964)] was required in order that the debate take place. See 74 Stat.
554 (1960).
112 Cf. N. MiNow, supra note 108, at 52, where he suggested to broadcasters that
they
sit down in front of [their] television set[s] when [their] station goes on the air
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three mitigating factors that might serve to eliminate blandness. First, the
licensee himself might determine that it is his duty to present controversial
issues, or secondly his audience may force such a determination upon him.
Finally, the FCC has the power to require licensee presentation of contro-
versial issues.'13
Blandness can result from an unequal enforcement of the regulations so
that the "equal time" regulations are given more weight than the requirement
for presentation of issues of public importance. If this occurs a void will be
created by the FCC which will not be filled by the broadcasting networks.
Since the licensee is generally considered to be a businessman, the answer
would appear to lie solely with the FCC.
This might suggest a more active role by the FCC in the broadcasting
industry. A circle is started when the broadcaster, as an example, pre-
sents a program in favor of government sponsored birth control. The FCC
then enforces the fairness doctrine to allow a religious organization to
reply to the views previously expressed. This is granted, free, by the
broadcaster. He now refrains from such controversial subjects until the
FCC requires him to present such programs, which, when done, involves
a new request for free time to reply.114 The FCC then would become the
and stay there without a book, magazine, newspaper, profit-and-loss sheet or
rating book to distract [them]-and keep [their] eyes glued to that set until the
station signs off. I can assure you that you will observe a vast wasteland.
(emphasis added.)
113 Licenses are granted by the FCC provided that the "public convenience, interest,
or necessity will be served" thereby. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), 309(a) (1964). Renewal
every three years is based on the same criteria. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964). The FCC
may revoke a license "because of conditions coming to the attention of the Commission
which would warrant it in refusing to grant a licensee. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2)
(1964). Also, any wilful or repeated violation of any rule or regulation of the FCC
is grounds for revocation. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (4) (1964). The FCC can issue cease
and desist orders, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1964); and they can seek mandamus through
the United States Attorney General in any United States District Court to have
licensees comply with provisions of the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(1964). Violation of the Act and of FCC regulations can also result in penal fines
and/or incarceration. 47 U.S.C. § 501, 502 (1964).
114 Cf. the following cases. The Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace
(BEM) has filed a complaint with the FCC that all-news radio station WTOP has
refused to accept paid one-minute announcements attacking United States participation
in the Vietnam War. Another complaint, filed by an attorney for three groups, San
Francisco Women for Peace, the G.L Ass'n, and the Resistance, states that no com-
mercial broadcaster in the San Francisco Bay area will air as public service announce-
ments (presumably free) responses to military recruiting announcements. L.A. Times,
Feb. 23, 1970, § 1, at 13, col. 1. These cases present several questions: Who is the
proper representative for the contradicting or opposing views? If the FCC requires the
stations carry the messages, isn't this tantamount to FCC programming which ulti-
mately results in FCC censorship in that the licensee can't program that particular air
time as he sees fit? Isn't this censorship in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964) which
states that "Nothing . . . shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship . . ."
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programmer of the nation's airwaves, at least so far as controversial sub-
jects are concerned." 5
The Supreme Court, however, gave consideration to a statement made
by the President of C.B.S. who was on record as stating:
we are determined to continue covering controversial issues as a public service,
and exercising our own independent news judgment and enterprise. I, for one,
refuse to allow that judgment and enterprise to be affected by official intimida-
tion.116
It was the observation of the Court that the industry "and in particular
the networks, have taken pains to present controversial issues in the past,""1
7
and viewed the statement of C.B.S. as a signal that this would continue in
the future. Not only was there no guarantee that this statement is a gen-
eral policy position of C.B.S., there was no assurance that the other net-
works would follow the lead.
The Court perhaps should have investigated how much of this "cover-
ing of controversial issues as a public service" was programmed at prime
time with no sponsor, because this is the effect the regulations might have
upon programming. There would be no problem if large corporations, in
search of a public image, continue to sponsor such examinations of "con-
troversial issues". But since sponsors seek public acceptance they might
demand a certain middle of the road approach to the issue at its incep-
tion. 1 8 Will sponsors be willing to underwrite a reply conceived and di-
rected by one over whom they had no financial control? If sponsors, or
their advertizing agencies, answer in the negative, the burden will be fully
placed upon the FCC to maintain the required standards.
But is the Commission itself the proper public organ to maintain the re-
quired standards? All would agree that nationwide distribution of visual
and vocal ideas should not be in the complete control of three men rep-
resenting three corporations." 9 The use of the FCC for relief might, how-
ever, only compound the problem. The Commission has seven members,
all appointed by the President and consented to by the Senate, who are re-
sponsible for the enforcement of the regulations.' 2 0  Congress has dictated
that "[not] more than four members of the Commission shall be members of
115 Again, wouldn't this seem to be prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964) as set out
above in note 114?
116 395 U.S. at 393 n.19, quoting address by F. Stanton, Sigma Delta Chi National
Convention, Atlanta, Ga., Nov. 21, 1968.
117 Id. at 393.
118 The sponsors in a desire to sell their products might seek to appeal to everyone
without offending anyone. This would tend toward presentation of non-controversial
subjects.
119 Vice President Spiro Agnew suggested this in his Nov. 13, 1969 speech supra note
60.
120 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) and (j) (1964).
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the same political party."'121 Realizing that there is inherent in this com-
mand, as well as the regulations, the concept that issues and debate can
always be broken down into two camps, Congress may, as well, have created
a less acceptable control than exists in the present oligopoly.
Rather than three competing powers, the FCC represents only one of two
competing controls, the head of the Democratic or Republican parties.
122 Al-
though Congress has staggered the appointments, one per year for a
seven year term, a President at the end of his first term can have com-
pletely controlled the Commission. This could be used as a tool for the re-
pression of ideas and debate by the appointment of four members willing
to interpret and enforce regulations in a biased manner.
However, the problem of bias is not an exclusive property of the govern-
ment. Vice President Agnew in a biting attack against the broadcast media
before the Mid-West Regional Republican Committee suggested that the
power of the networks rivals that of local and federal government com-
bined..2 3  Complaining that "the American People would rightly not toler-
ate this concentration of power in Government", 2 4 he suggested no remedy:
Now I want to make myself perfectly clear. I'm not asking for Government
censorship or any other kind of censorship. I'm asking whether a form of censor-
ship already exists when the news that 40 million Americans receive each night is
determined by a handful of men responsible only to their corporate employers.
125
This confusion over the proper remedy to a recognized problem con-
121 47 U.S.C. § 154(b) (1964).
122 This assumes that, as the political structure of the United States presently exists,
the President of the United States would be either a Democrat or a Republican.
123 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at 24, col. 4.
124 Id.
125 Id. at col. 5. Dr. Frank Stanton, President of C.B.S., in response to the Nov. 13,
1969 attack by Vice President Agnew stated:
We do not believe ... that this unprecedented attempt by the Vice President
of the United States to intimidate a news medium which depends for its existence
upon Government licenses represents legitimate criticism. Id. at 24, col. 6-7.
And Julian Goodman, President of N.B.C., responded by calling the Vice President's
speech an "appeal to prejudice". Id. at 24, col. 8. He went on to state that "evidently
he would prefer a different kind of television reporting-one that would be subservient to
whatever political group was in authority at the time." Id.
However, Steven McCormick, Vice President of the Mutual Broadcasting Company,
reportedly merely saw the Vice President's speech as a "call for fairness, balance,
responsibility and accuracy in news presentation." Id. at 25, col. 1.
A recent editorial in The New Yorker, Feb. 28, 1970, referred to this speech and
subsequent speeches by the Vice President as "The government's campaign against the
press". Id. at 29. The editorial stated that the press has moved toward compliance
with the Vice President's demands contained within his speechs. It is stated that "The
new 'fairness'-i.e., 'fairness' to the Administration-has become indistinguishable from
fear of the Administration. In hundreds of tiny ways, news coverage now seems to
reflect an eagerness to please the people in positions of power." Id. Then it is
declared that "The eagerness for uncontroversial issues is keen." Id. at 30.
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cedes the difficult, if not insurmountable problems inherent in any outside
regulation of the presentation of viewpoints. If a "right of access" is
granted to the public against newspapers the problem of a practical remedy
would be far more complex. Not only would the practical problems of en-
forcement present government with similar problems as found in the
broadcasting medium, constitutional concepts would have to be revalued.
It takes little imagination to assume that the role of the press in the late
1700's was vastly different from the newspaper of today. The role of
government and its ability for, and history of, censorship and press con-
trol was paramount in the minds of the authors of the Constitution.
126
Broadcasting, alternatively, having but recent historical roots127 and coupled
with a natural scarcity of outlets,' 28 allowed government a freer hand in
control without unduly arousing its citizens. This has been accepted by
the public and government, and this acceptance has been recognized by
the Supreme Court.
Newness itself was accepted by the Court as deserving of perhaps dif-
ferent standards in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Incorporated,129 a
1948 censorship issue concerning a new medium-motion pictures. This was
again commented upon with approval in Red Lion:
Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest, United States v. Paramount . . . differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.'
3 0
If newness, or post-constitution scientific developments require a shift-
ing standard it might flow logically that the protection afforded newspapers
might also require a renewed investigation.' 3 ' The purpose of a consti-
tutional protection for the press had as its foundation the concept that
citizens should have the ability to communicate and exchange different
ideas. Guaranteed by freedom of speech, the framers recognized the new
power position given to an idea if it could be widely disseminated by use of
the press. A press heartily protected in the late 1700's could meet the
desire of the framer's "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoliza-
120 See W. HOcKING, FREEDOM OF Tm PREsS 8-12 (1947).
127 "Sound broadcasting.. . may be said to have come into being about 1920, while
television broadcasting began about 1940." 4 ENcYCLOPEDIA BRIANNIcA, Broadcasting
206 (1954).
128 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-99 (1969).
129 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
130 395 U.S. at 386.
'3' Scientific developments in the printing and distribution processes along with the
cost of such developments to the publisher have led to a diminution of the number of
major newspapers in the United States.
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tion of that market .... "1132
The press in the late 1700's was seen as effectively open to all who de-
sired to become involved in the "marketplace of ideas". The new press of
today has seen the number of newspapers diminish. The economic costs
of starting a newspaper that can compete with the remaining newspapers
is staggering. And with two press services writing much that appears in the
limited number of newspapers that exist, the marketplace of ideas in the
new press has developed to the point that it is no longer open to all. And,
as was stated in Red Lion:
There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship
operating in a medium not open to all. 'Freedom of the press from governmental
interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests." 33
Today, the power of the press is a totally different power. A power to
stifle and hide ideas as well as personalities exists.' 3 4  A power which
when recognized in the new media of broadcasting brought some govern-
ment action to retain for its citizens the "collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and purpose of the First Amend-
ment."'13 5 This language could just as easily be applied to the adhesive
conditions found in today's new newspaper industry.
Treating the newspaper publisher as a proxy of the public might well
be a concept the Court will be timid to adopt. Not without reason, such
a shattering of traditional protection might well put before the public the
issue of constitutional validity itself, a process guaranteed to cause unrest.
But not to tread these dangerous waters may be to uphold the image of a
protective Constitution while emasculating its most basic protection.
Donald D. Moss
132 395 U.S. at 390.
'33 Id. at 392.
'34 The editorial in The New Yorker, Feb. 28, 1970, supra note 125, at 30, pointed
out:
One of the most distressing results of the new standard of news coverage has been
the minimal space given to statements by the very few politicians who have been
warning of growing repression.
135 395 U.S. at 390.
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